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Jurisdictional Statement 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case because the alleged 
crime committed by the Defendant in violation of Utah law purportedly occurred in the 
Sixth Judicial District, Sevier County, in the State of Utah where he was originally on 
trial for criminal charges and those proceedings have resulted in a final order for this 
Court to review. 
Statement of Issues 
The first main issue is whether the jury made a clearly erroneous finding of guilt 
based on the lack of sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed or used a 
controlled substance. 
The second main issue is whether the jury made a clearly erroneous finding of 
guilt based on the lack of sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant possessed drug paraphernalia. 
Assuming, but not conceding, the Court concludes that the Defendant did, in fact, 
possess drug paraphernalia, the third main issue is whether the jury made a clearly 
erroneous finding of guilt based on the lack of sufficient direct and circumstantial 
evidence proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant possessed drug 
paraphernalia with intent to use it, and to use it for at least one of these purposes: to plant, 
propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, 
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or 
otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body. 
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The fourth main issue is whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the plain 
language of the U.C.A. § 58-37A-5 when it allowed the jury's finding to remain as 
sufficient, which simply found, "with regard to Count 2, guilty, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a Class B misdemeanor" {Transcript, p. 338), but the jury's finding 
entirely failed to mention whether the Defendant had any intent to use the particular drug 
paraphernalia for any of the twenty-two explicit purposes listed under the statute. 
The fifth main issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of possession based on a broken chain of 
evidence when the court itself stated that "we may not have exactly a perfect chain of 
evidence or chain of custody." Transcript, p. 241. 
The sixth main issue is whether the case should have been dismissed under the 
doctrine of plain error or abuse of discretion because of the spoliation of evidence when 
the State failed to bring forth a requested urine sample it initially said was lost, but then 
represented it was still in existence. 
The seventh main issue is whether the case should have been dismissed under the 
doctrine of plain error because of the State withholding potentially exculpatory evidence 
in the form of a non-produced urine sample that had been requested twice by motions and 
which the State continued to assert was not lost at trial. 
The eighth main issues is whether the trial court erred in rejecting the Defendant's 
proposed jury instruction that is consistent with case law regarding the State's need to 
preclude all reasonable possibilities or alternate hypotheses of innocence in 
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circumstantial evidence cases in order for a defendant to be found guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Standard of Review 
The Court will need to apply the following standards: 
The material findings are clearly erroneous because all the evidence supporting the 
findings is legally insufficient to support the findings when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings in this matter. 
Furthermore, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motions 
and/or granting the State's motions. 
In addition, the trial court incorrectly interpreted the plain language of the Utah 
Constitution and Utah statutes. 
Lastly, there was also plain error in not dismissing the case because there was (1) 
error (2) that is plain (3) that affected substantial rights of the Defendant and (4) which 
error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings. 
Constitutional or Statutory Provisions 
According to U.C.A. § 58-37-8(2)(A)(I), "It is unlawful for any person knowingly 
and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or a controlled 
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a 
practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or as 
otherwise authorized by this chapter." 
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According to U.C.A. § 58-37A-5, "It is unlawful for any person to use, or to 
possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, 
harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, 
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this 
subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." 
According to U.C.A. § 58-37-2(l)(ii), "'Possession' or 'use' means the joint or 
individual ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or 
the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from 
distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group possession 
or use of controlled substances. For a person to be a possessor or user of a controlled 
substance, it is not required that the person be shown to have individually possessed, 
used, or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly 
participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of any substances 
with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the controlled substance is found in a 
place or under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over it." Emphasis added. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 says, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
Statement of Case 
This case is criminal in nature and on November 2, 2009, a jury found the 
Defendant guilty of the underlying offenses of possession of a controlled substance in 
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violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-8(2)(A)(I), a third degree felony, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia in violation of U.C.A. § 58-37A-5 a class B misdemeanor. Sentence has 
been imposed. The verdict and orders being final, it is now ready to be heard on the 
appellate level. 
Statement of Facts 
1. On October 20, 2005, at 10:30 a.m. six officers of the Central Utah Narcotics Task 
Force executed a search warrant. Transcript, p. 96. 
2. The search warrant provided for law enforcement to search for illegal drugs, 
paraphernalia, packaging material, and scales. Transcript, p. 96. 
3. The location specified in the warrant was a non-moving trailer and garage-like 
building, which was on the property of a residence located at 360 South Canal 
Road in Elsinore, Utah. Transcript, pp. 97, 166. 
4. The property and residence was that of Morris Crabb, the father of the Defendant. 
The owner of the trailer in 2005 and 2006 was Trent Jensen. Transcript, pp. 96, 
188, 247-248, 275, 277-278. 
5. After entry into the garage, pulling things back to get in, the officers entered the 
already open door of the trailer. At that time, one of the officers noticed there was 
a couch, a so-called "bed" made only of blankets, some closet spaces, and a sink. 
Transcript, pp. 105, 126,196-198, 212, 262-263. 
6. The details about the couch and bed, however, were not in the original police 
report, but were from an officer's memory after four years later and after about a 
thousand cases he had handled. Transcript, pp. 130, 134. 
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7. None of the other five officers prepared reports, only Detective Ekker. Transcript, 
p. 168. 
8. Other officers testified that the "bed" may have only been a fold-down or fold-out 
couch, some item of furniture, or even a table. Transcript, pp. 172, 200. 
9. Other witnesses testified that there was no bed in the trailer. The Defendant did 
not use it as a place to stay or sleep. Transcript, pp. 260-261, 271, 280-281. 
10. An officer described the trailer to be unsuitable for sleeping—"hard to imagine 
anyone sleeping there." Transcript, p. 205. 
11. The sink did not appear to be used and there appeared to be no water hooked up to 
it. Transcript, p. 105. 
12. There did not appear to be any way to heat the trailer. Transcript, p. 152. 
13. There did not appear to be any locks to lock the garage or trailer. One witness, 
who had been in the trailer "two dozen" times, testified, "There was no lock on 
any of the doors." Transcript, pp. 184, 263, 271. 
14. There did not appear to be multiple changes of clothes in the trailer. Transcript, p. 
153. 
15. The Defendant regularly slept in a separate home from the trailer. Transcript, pp. 
263, 280, 287. 
16. One of the officers allegedly found the Defendant in "bed" inside the trailer, 
sleeping in sweatpants and a tee shirt. Transcript, pp.106, 132-133, 166-167. 
17. Another officer testified the Defendant was in boxers or pajamas and that he was 
definitely topless. Transcript, p. 178. 
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18. An officer secured the Defendant and took him to the garage, which was a 
painting area for cars and doing mechanical things. It was built in 2005. 
Transcript, pp. 108, 257, 265, 269, 276. 
19. At times, multiple people working with tools were there in the garage and others 
were there wanting this or that fixed and in the middle of this business, there were 
multiple times when the Defendant was not there. Transcript, pp. 259-260, 270, 
276, 284. 
20. Some of these people were Dwayne Solomon, Dustin Grledhill, and Dillon 
Gledhill, all of whom had easy access to the garage and trailer as well as anyone 
else. Transcript, pp. 270-271, 284. 
21. The people at the garage and trailer, who were not necessarily even friends, 
sometimes were doing nothing more than "just hanging out,55 or not doing 
anything recognizable, or "just sitting in their car.55 Transcript, pp. 260, 266, 270. 
22. The area in which the Defendant was found was not a "bedroom,55 it was an office, 
which was a part of his workshop. The office and workshop had been set up for at 
least six months in 2005. Transcript, pp. 149-150, 199, 257, 261, 275, 281, 283. 
23. The trailer, though, had been on the property for about ten years. Transcript, p. 
283. 
24. It was very cluttered, dirty, filthy, and messy with a lot of garbage on the floor and 
"crap everywhere,55 which mess had probably resulted from a very long time of 
accumulation. Transcript, pp. 139-140, 166, 205, 211, 271. 
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25. At the end of the office/trailer were tires, air compressors, paint, and things to 
work on cars with. Transcript, pp. 261-262. 
26. Inside the trailer, other officers alerted one another about what they believed to be 
evidence. Transcript, p. 108. 
27. The officers took photographs before touching the possible evidence, but the 
photographs could not be located at the time of trial due to mishandling at the 
evidence locker and at the police office in keeping the chain of custody. 
Transcript,^. 150-151. 
28. In a back closet, a detective found a broken light bulb that was, by his estimation, 
perhaps an arm's reach away from the bed. Transcript, pp. 109-110. 
29. Another officer was not able to recall where the closet was in relation to the bed or 
to the corners of the trailer and whether the door to the trailer was open or closed. 
Transcript, p. 209. 
30. The broken light bulb appeared to have residue in it. Transcript, p. 109. 
31. Another light bulb, which was not broken, was found at the end of a couch and in 
a cubby hole or a corner and on the floor of the trailer. Transcript, pp. 112, 190, 
199. 
32. The light bulbs were altered, the center metal piece of the general, surrounding 
metal piece being bored out. Transcript, p. 114. 
33. One of the Officers, Detective Ekker, was the case agent, who was responsible for 
packaging and indentifying the evidence gathered. Transcript, pp. 134-135. 
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34. The case agent, however, was not the only one involved in the process of 
packaging and identifying the evidence. Transcript, p. 135. 
35. The two other officers were Rod Elmer and Dwight Jenkins. Transcript, p. 136. 
36. The case agent could not recall which pieces of evidence he packaged and 
identified. He had no notes to help him, either. Transcript, pp. 135-136. 
37. The items were put in bags and taken to the Sevier County evidence locker that 
has an evidence custodian administering the locker. Transcript, pp. L10, 113, 116. 
38. The Defendant was taken to the county jail and he gave a urine sample to law 
enforcement. Transcript, pp. 151, 178. 
39. According to the case agent, the urine sample had been "transferred to Fillmore, 
but it is in the freezer, it is frozen, it is in Fillmore." Transcript, p. 152. 
40. The urine sample was either exculpatory evidence that was withheld, inculpatory 
evidence that was not important enough to be a part of the State's case, or it was 
lost through careless safekeeping of the evidence. It was never produced, even 
after multiple requests by Defendant, over a six month period. Ultimately, the trial 
court told the jury it was lost and never sent to the crime lab. Transcript, pp. 151-
152, 164, 241-243, 246-253, 302. 
41. The urine sample testing dirty would have been relevant to help show the 
Defendant's guilt and it testing clean would have been relevant to help show he 
was not guilty. Transcript, p. 243. 
42. On November 23, 2005, more than a month after the initial search, the case agent 
went to the evidence locker, checked out the broken light bulb from the custodian 
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for about five minutes, and he (instead of a forensic scientist) collected residue 
from it by scraping the glass with a razor. Transcript, pp. 116, 118, 140-144, 242. 
43. The case agent put the residue in a small, Ziploc baggie and then placed the baggie 
in a manila envelope. Transcript, pp. 118-119. 
44. Captain Gary Reed witnessed the scraping and the placing of it in the baggie, but 
he was not brought to trial for any questioning about what the case agent had done. 
Transcript, pp. 117-119. 
45. The case agent personally delivered the envelope to the State Crime Lab in Cedar 
City. Transcript, pp. 116, 119, 122. 
46. From the time the case agent collected it to the time he dropped it off to the lab, 
the case agent was in possession of the scraping. Transcript, pp. 122-123. 
47. The baggie for the scraping, however, was never returned to the evidence locker 
and the trial court acknowledged that "we may not have exactly a perfect chain of 
evidence or chain of custody." Transcript, p. 240-241. 
48. Before any expert testimony on the nature of the residue from the broken light 
bulb, the trial court allowed the residue scrapings in as evidence over the objection 
of Defendant. Transcript, p. 121. 
49. Before any expert testimony on the nature of the residue on the intact light bulb, 
the trial court allowed the intact light bulb in as evidence over the objection of 
Defendant. Transcript, ip. 121. 
50. A fingerprint expert analyzed the second light bulb gathered at the scene for 
fingerprints and found some, but they did not match the Defendant s fingerprints. 
Transcript, pp. 147-148. 
51. At the lab, the residue evidence was placed on a sheet of paper from the lab's 
photocopier copy paper and not on any surface that is proven to be sterile. The 
evidence was then tested. Transcript, pp. 229-231. 
52. In fact, the forensic scientist admitted that "if there was any contamination, it 
would have been on the piece of paper where I set the evidence on," which is then 
thrown away "into a garbage can," preventing any further examination of the 
paper to determine if it was contaminated. Transcript, p. 231. 
53. The vials that will hold the to-be-tested substances, however, "come sealed in a 
sealed thing" and "we do not reuse vials, absolutely not," in order to "make sure 
there's no contamination." Transcript, pp. 230, 232. 
54. The lab has certainly "scraped substances off light bulbs." This allows the forensic 
scientist who analyzes the evidence to be able to "testify that there was no 
contamination from scraping it off the light bulb." Transcript, p. 233. 
55. After viewing the broken bulb, the forensic scientist stated that "we receive this 
type of evidence in the laboratory a lot" and that she could have tested the broken 
bulb. Transcript, pp. 237-238. 
56. The forensic scientist herself tests over three hundred methamphetamine samples a 
year. Transcript, p. 219. 
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57. No admissible testimony was presented on how the broken bulb residue was 
returned from the lab in Cedar City to the evidence room in Sevier County. 
Transcript, pp. 240-241. 
58. At the time when the evidence was gathered and at the time of trial, the color of 
the residue on the broken bulb was either a burnt black or a white. The officers 
called it a burnt, black color while the forensic scientist at the lab described it as 
white. Transcript, pp. 109, 113, 115, 144-145 ("black and burnt,'5 said by the 
officer who scraped it out of the broken bulb), 193, and 222 ("white residue55 of 
what the scientist received), 223 ("white powder"), 224, 225 ("white substance," 
as reiterated by the judge), 228. 
59. When the Defendant's attorney looked at the original light bulb himself and 
showed it to the forensic scientist, he said to her, "I can see—all I can see is 
black." Transcript, p. 235. 
60. The forensic scientist replied, "Usually burnt residue is more associated with the 
marijuana pipe than it would be a meth pipe. Usually the residue of a meth pipe is 
more of a white/brownish." Transcript, p. 235. 
61. There is confusion over the evidentiary sample having a black colored residue and 
yet testing positive for methamphetamine, which is usually white or brownish. 
Transcript, p. 235. 
62. The forensic scientist, though, clearly tested a white residue. Transcript, p. 235. 
63. There is no way to know how old the evidence tested at the lab actually was—it 
could have been "twenty" years old. Transcript, p. 236-237. 
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64. When shown the broken bulb at trial, the forensic scientist stated that she would 
classify the residue "as white" or an "off-white color' and as "browns." 
Transcript, p. 236. 
65. The trial court denied Defendant's proposed jury instruction that would explain 
that the State has the burden in circumstantial evidence cases to eliminate all 
reasonable inferences that point to innocence. Transcript, p. 303. 
66. The proposed jury instruction would have read: "You are not permitted to find the 
defendant guilty of the charges against him based totally on circumstantial 
evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only consistent with the theory 
the defendant is guilty of the crime, but cannot be reconciled with any other 
rational conclusion." Transcript, p. 297. 
67. The State read to the jury an instruction, saying, "I want you to focus your 
attention towards the bottom of that paragraph." Transcript, 317. The State went 
on to explain that "possession" element is sufficiently met if the controlled 
substance is found "quote, under circumstances indicating that the person had the 
ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over it." Transcript, 317. 
Summary of Argument 
The Defendant should not have been found guilty because a reasonable jury must 
have entertained reasonable doubt from the State's lack of ability to preclude the 
reasonable alternatives and inferences of innocence in their circumstantial evidence case 
against the Defendant. The trial court should have dismissed the case for an imperfect 
chain of custody that not all who had handled the evidence were brought to testify at and 
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should have dismissed it due to the State's withholding of, or loss of, highly relevant and 
apparently exculpatory evidence. The trial court erred in rejecting the Defendant's jury 
instruction, causing prejudice against him because a verdict of not guilty would likely 
have resulted. 
Argument 
L 
THE JURY MADE A CLEARLY ERRONEOUS FINDING OF GUILT BASED ON THE LACK OF 
SUFFICIENT DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PROVING BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY 
POSSESSED OR USED A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
A. The Defendant did not commit the actus reus of possessing a controlled 
substance. 
In order to be guilty of a violating of U.C.A. § 58-37-8(2)(A)(I), a defendant must 
have satisfied the element to "possess or use a controlled substance analog or a controlled 
substance." This is the actus reus element of the crime that must be met. According to 
State v. Gonzales, 2 P. 3d 954, 957 (Utah App. 2000), "We will not make speculative 
leaps across gaps in the evidence. Every element of the crime charged must be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. To affirm the jury's verdict, we must be sure the State has 
introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." Internal 
quotations and alterations omitted. In the current case, all the elements were not so 
established. 
At trial, the evidence established that the Defendant never personally had physical 
possession of the evidence. He, therefore, could only have had constructive possession. 
"Possession of a controlled substance sufficient to sustain a conviction need not be actual 
18 
but may be constructive." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318-319 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Bingham, 732 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1987); State v. Layman, 953 P. 2d 782, 787 (Utah 
App. 1998). However, "In cases relying on constructive possession, that burden requires 
a presentation of extensive and detailed facts." Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 975 P. 2d 
501, 504 (Utah App. 1999) (emphasis added); see also State v. Layman, 953 P. 2d 782, 
(Utah App. 1998). 
According to State v. Anderton, 668 P. 2d 1258, 1264 (Utah 1983), "[I]n finding 
constructive possession of controlled substances in nonexclusive occupancy settings, 
courts have relied on extensive and detailed factual evidence" Emphasis added. The 
evidence at trial fell short of being extensive and detailed to establish proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the Defendant's guilt. The evidence established that the Defendant 
was found during the day in an area that multiple people also occupied during that same 
time where contraband was allegedly found, but the evidence failed to exclude other 
reasonable sources for the alleged drugs and paraphernalia. 
The evidence linking the Defendant to the alleged methamphetamine and 
paraphernalia is purely circumstantial because no one actually saw him physically 
possessing them. In this case, the State relied on the circumstantial definition of 
possession found in U.C.A. § 58-37-2(l)(ii) in his closing arguments to the jury. Reading 
them a specific portion of a jury instruction, he said, "I want you to focus your attention 
towards the bottom of that paragraph." Transcript, 317. He went on to explain that 
"possession55 is sufficiently met if the controlled substance is found "quote, under 
circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the intent to exercise 
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dominion and control over it." Transcript, 317. Emphasis added. The State emphasized 
and made it abundantly clear that the evidence connecting the Defendant to the crime was 
purely circumstantial. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[w]here the only evidence presented 
against the defendant is circumstantial, the evidence supporting a conviction must 
preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This is because the existence of a 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt." State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion) 
(citing State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). In this case, therefore, the State 
had the burden to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of the Defendant's innocence. As 
demonstrated below, the State clearly failed to do so. 
The residue sample may have been contaminated'. "Before a substance connected 
with the commission of a crime is admissible as evidence, there must be a showing that 
the proposed exhibit is what it purports to be and is in substantially the same condition as 
it was at the time of the crime." State v. Wvnia, 754 P. 2d 667, 671 (Utah App. 1988) 
citing State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 110-111, 498 P.2d 670, 672 (1972). The 
evidence at trial established that there was a broken bulb inside of an office closet, which 
bulb may have had methamphetamine residue on it. The illegal drug may not have been 
on the bulb due to potential contamination from non-sterile paper used by the crime 
laboratory before testing the scrapings from the broken bulb, making it not in 
"substantially the same condition" as at the crime scene. State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 
108, 110-111 498 P.2d 670. 672 (19721 
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Except for the non-sterile papei, the forensic scientist at the laboratory took 
meticulous precautions to prevent contamination. These precautions included using vials 
before the actual analysis that are pre-sealed in order to prevent any contamination. The 
forensic scientist did not make such an effort for the printer paper she used to dump the 
to-be-tested residue on. 
Instead, the forensic scientist used paper that was out in the open and vulnerable to 
foreign contaminants. This is especially concerning because the forensic scientist herself 
receives and tests over three hundred foreign methamphetamine samples a year. 
Transcript, p. 219. The scientist admitted that the contamination would have come from 
the paper she used. Transcript, p. 231. 
Instead of being able to examine the paper for contaminants, such analysis was 
prevented because the paper had been thrown away. The State failed to submit evidence 
that would contradict the genuine possibility that the particular piece of photocopier 
paper used in this case had not already been contaminated. 
The State was unable to exclude the real possibility that was established by the 
forensic scientist to rationally doubt the validity of the test, which showed positive for 
methamphetamine, and, therefore, doubt whether the Defendant committed the actus reus 
of possessing a controlled substance. There is a real chance that he was innocent. Under 
these circumstances, the State failed to produce "evidence supporting a conviction5' that 
would "preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 
222 (Utah 1986). 
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The substance on the bulb and the substance tested were two different substances. 
As previously noted, "Before a substance connected with the commission of a crime is 
admissible as evidence, there must be a showing that the proposed exhibit is what it 
purports to be and is in substantially the same condition as it was at the time of the 
crime." State v. Wynia, 754 P. 2d 667, 671 (Utah App. 1988) citing State v. Madsen, 28 
Utah 2d 108, 110-111, 498 P.2d 670, 672 (1972). Another reason to doubt the sample is 
that the original residue was a burnt "black" color, as testified to by the case agent who 
scraped it from the broken bulb. Transcript, pp. 144-145. The sample the forensic 
scientist received was clearly not black. It was the exact opposite: a "white powder." 
Transcript, p. 223. 
The sample the scientist received was never even described as brown or off-white. 
It was nothing close to black. The evidence shows the sample was not substantially the 
same and it suggests an affirmative show of tampering. See State v. Wynia, 754 P. 2d 
667, 671 (Utah App. 1988) ("it is generally presumed that the exhibits were handled with 
regularity, absent an affirmative showing of bad faith or actual tampering" Emphasis 
added). The State failed to offer any evidence rebutting this show of tampering and it 
failed to prove that the sample was in the same condition as it had been when it was 
collected. It was, therefore, an abuse of discretion on the trial court's part to admit the 
sample as evidence. 
The case agent was unqualified to scrape the residue and he was not supposed to 
scrape it: Nowhere in the evidence at trial was there any assurance that the case agent, 
who scraped the residue off the bulb, was qualified to do so or allowed to do so. Without 
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such an assurance, the case agent tampered with or altered the evidence. See generally 
U.C.A. § 76-8-510.5 or U.C.A. § 76-8-306. Not only may he have been unqualified, but 
there was also no need for him to do so and he was not instructed to do so, either. 
Testimony established that the laboratory handles broken bulbs frequently and that this 
particular broken bulb could have been analyzed by the forensic scientist herself. She 
could then have been able to testify, as a less prejudiced witness, that there was no 
contamination in the scraping of the residue off the broken bulb. 
With the fact that the evidence at trial established two different substances 
involved, the State failed to contradict the reasonable inference that the case agent could 
have been the one who unintentionally, or even intentionally, contaminated the evidence. 
This is especially so considering that the scrapings happened in close proximity to the 
evidence locker where illegal drug evidence is brought in and regularly kept. 
The State failed to bring in Captain Reed's testimony to exclude the doubt that the 
case agent did not intentionally scrape a different substance into the evidence baggie 
when Captain Reed was watching. Again, the State failed to produce "evidence 
supporting a conviction" that would 'preclude every reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence," (State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986)), which was required after the 
evidence demonstrated that the sample scraped and the sample delivered to the scientist 
were not the same. 
The investigation and safekeeping of evidence was careless and raises legitimate 
doubt as to the believability of it. Finally, the investigation by the officers is fraught with 
reasons to doubt its validity. The Due Process Clause provides two forms of protection to 
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a criminal defendant. The Federal Due Process Clause, made applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, states: "No State shall...deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Constamend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2; Utah 
Const. Art. I, § 7. Due Process guarantees a defendant access to evidence "that is either 
material to the guilt of the defendant or relevant to the punishment to be imposed" so as 
to ensure that "defendants [are] afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 
defense.'5 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 L.Ed.2d 
413 (1984). This guarantee provides the defendant access to all evidence that "might be 
expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense." Id at 488, 104 S.Ct. at 2534. 
To meet this standard, "evidence must both possess an [apparent] exculpatory value...and 
be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by 
other reasonably available means." Id at 489, 104 S.Ct. at 2534 (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). 
In this case, the Defendant was deprived of Due Process rights by a number of 
deprivations of significantly exculpatory pieces of evidence. First, only one of the six 
officers made a report about the arrest, depriving the Defendant of exculpatory evidence 
that could have attacked the credibility and accuracy of the original report. 
Second, the officers could not recall the details accurately and they contradicted 
each other, depriving the Defendant of a reliable investigation into the facts of the case. 
Third, and most importantly, they lost the Defendant's urine sample and crime 
scene photographs, all of which were essential to a proper investigation and which would 
have played a significant role in the Defendant's defense. The pictures and urine sample 
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had apparent exculpatory value in showing the Defendant was not guilty of either using 
or possessing the drugs and paraphernalia. They were of such a nature that the Defendant 
could not obtain comparable evidence by any other available means—a subsequent urine 
test would not have had any value in showing the lack of methamphetamine in his system 
if it were taken once the need for it became known, which was years after the original 
sample was taken; no pictures could have been produced later to show the exact 
placement of the supposedly incriminating evidence away from the Defendant because 
they had been put into evidence bags and taken away. The loss of all of these pieces of 
evidence was a clear violation of his Due Process rights and should have been sufficient 
to have the trial dismissed. 
In addition, as previously discussed, the case agent scraped evidence out of a bulb 
that was fully within the capability and qualifications of the laboratory's forensic scientist 
to do; the only need for him to do it would have been to plant false evidence. 
In the end, the officers were sloppy and untrustworthy, and they violated his Due 
Process rights in preventing him from putting on a complete defense with apparently 
exculpatory evidence that was either withheld or lost. 
Thus, based on the multiple reasons to doubt the validity of the test sample and to 
doubt the reliability of the investigation, the State failed to demonstrate beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the residue was methamphetamine and that the Defendant 
possessed any controlled substance at the time of his arrest. The State failed to "preclude 
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence" (State v. HilK 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986)) 
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at trial in this case, a case of circumstantial evidence tying the Defendant to the purported 
drugs and paraphernalia. 
B. The Defendant did not knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled 
substance. 
In order to be guilty of a violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-8(2)(A)(I), a defendant must 
"knowingly and intentionally" possess or use a controlled substance. This is the mens 
rea element of the crime. For the following reasons, the State failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that both (1) the Defendant knew of the existence of the potentially 
incriminating evidence and (2) that he had any intent to possess the evidence for any 
purpose. The factual circumstances of the case must permit the inference that the 
Defendant intended to use the drugs as his own. 
In the face of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, "whether a sufficient 
nexus between the accused and the contraband exists depends upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case." State v. Fox, 709 P. 2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Watts, 750 P. 2d 1219, 1224 (Utah 1988). The existence of a sufficient nexus to prove 
constructive possession is a "highly fact-sensitive determination." State v. Layman, 985 
P. 2d 911,913 (Utah 199). 
The Utah courts have previously held that many of the factors indicating 
possession, by themselves, are insufficient to establish the requisite nexus. Persons who 
"might know of the whereabouts of illicit drugs and who might even have access to them, 
but who have no intent to obtain and use the drugs can not [sic] be convicted of 
possession of a controlled substance." State v. Fox, 709 P. 2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). 
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Emphasis added See Fox, 709 P 2d at 320 (holding that co-occupancy of a house where 
marijuana was bemg grown, absent other evidence, was insufficient to establish a nexus), 
Anderton, 668 P 2d at 1264 (holding that co-ownership and co-occupancy of a home 
were insufficient to establish a nexus), Spanish Fork City v Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, ^ 
2, 10, 975 P 2d 501 (holdmg that co-occupancy of bedroom where drug paraphernalia 
was found was insufficient to establish a nexus), State v Salas, 820 P 2d 1386, 1389 
(Utah App 1991) (holdmg that ownership and co-occupancy of a vehicle, along with an 
anonymous informant's tip, was insufficient to establish a nexus) One factor present m 
this case was multiple occupancies of the workshop The Defendant's proximity to the 
contraband is disputable because he was asleep when awakened by the officers and the 
evidence established that the paraphernalia may not have even been m plam view since 
one was in a closet and the other was m a cubby hole on the ground 
The State failed to establish a sufficient nexus and demonstrate beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the residue did not come from a different source than the 
Defendant The factual evidence at trial did not establish the age of the residue, but 
expert testimony established that it could have been on the bulb for as many as "twenty" 
years prior to the date the Defendant was arrested Transcript, p 236-237 The State 
failed to bring any facts or evidence to contradict the likelihood that the residue was of an 
older ongm It, therefore, failed to "preclude" (State v Hill 727 P 2d 221, 222 (Utah 
1986)) the residue as coming from a source besides the Defendant, such as the original 
owner of the trailer, by any facts or evidence to the contrary 
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The evidence established that the broken bulb was not the Defendant's. The facts 
and evidence at trial established that a light bulb belonged to another person. A 
fingerprint expert examined the bulb, "found some fingerprints" (Transcript, pp. 147-
148) on it, but they did not belong to the Defendant. No other facts or evidence 
contradicting the ownership of this bulb as being the person who touched it was brought 
to trial and certainly no facts or evidence were brought to establish the Defendant as the 
one who touched or owned the light bulbs. No facts or evidence established the 
Defendant had used any tools to alter the bulbs. 
The only fact the State successfully established by witness testimony was that 
someone else had used the bulb in which to burn a residue. By this evidence of 
ownership or use by another, the State contradicted its own allegation that the Defendant 
intended to possess or use the possibly incriminating bulbs. 
The State clearly failed to "preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence" 
(State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (Utah 1986)) because the person whose 
fingerprints on the paraphernalia is more likely the criminal than the Defendant since the 
Defendant was never seen touching it, possessing drugs on his person, having them in his 
system, or doing any other kind of incriminating behavior. 
The Defendant's potentially inculpatory or exculpatory? urine sample was lost. 
The State could have helped demonstrate intent to use a controlled substance if it showed 
(1) that the alleged methamphetamine on the purported light bulb paraphernalia was of 
recent origin or proximity in time to the Defendant, (2) that the residue was more likely 
methamphetamine through non-contaminating procedures, and (3) that the Defendant 
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mtended to use the paraphernalia for the purpose of inhaling methamphetamme if the lost 
or withheld urine sample the Defendant had given tested positive for methamphetamme 
Because the State failed to adequately show any of these, it also failed to establish any 
mtent on Defendant's part to intentionally possess a controlled substance 
The State failed to exclude the other possible sources for the bulbs and 
methamphetamme, including the first owner of the trailer The State failed in its burden 
to show the residue had been burned in recent origin or that it had any proximity in time 
to the Defendant other than the residue on die bulbs bemg present in the same office that 
he was in In fact, testimony established that the trailer m which the bulbs with residue 
were found had been on the property for ten years and had a mess in it that had 
accumulated over a long period of time The ongmal owner of the trailer could have left 
the purported methamphetamme residue there from ten years m 1he past The State 
brought no evidence to suggest the trailer had been cleaned out and put mto pristine 
condition when Mr Crabb, Sr allowed the trailer to be placed on his property They 
gave no evidence that the prior owner did not have a criminal history for 
methamphetamme No evidence was presented to suggest the light bulbs themselves 
were of recent makmg And, agam, no evidence that the forensic scientist was aware of 
could establish that the methamphetamme was not ten years old or older The State 
clearly failed to preclude reasonable alternatives for the source of the residue and bulbs 
State v Hill 727 P 2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (Utah 1986) 
Placement of the bulbs in the mess demonstrates that they could have been around 
since the first owner The bulbs were found among the mess m places within the trailer 
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that demonstrate they may not have been placed there recently and that they may not 
have been in plain view. One may have found its way into a cubby hole at the end of a 
couch on a floor and the other stationed away inside of a closet. Their placement 
indicates they were not necessarily of recent origin and were pushed to the sides as the 
messes accumulated, not being as visible as something new in the middle of the room. 
This gives reason to doubt that the Defendant possessed them. One of the bulbs was even 
broken, suggesting that over time it could have been smashed by the clutter that was 
accumulating and ignored because it was not clearly visible. Most people pick up and 
throw away dangerous items such as broken glass / / they see it. This leads to the 
inevitable conclusion that the State failed to preclude reasonable inferences that he was 
not the owner or possessor of the alleged contraband, which the State would have to have 
done in this circumstantial case. State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (Utah 
1986). 
The State failed to exclude the other possible sources for the bulbs and 
methamphetamine, including the other people who came to the trailer, "We note that 
neither possibilities nor probabilities can substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Spanish Fork City v. Bryan. 1999 UT App 61, f 10, 975 P. 2d 501, 504. The 
State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was the only one 
who could have possessed the contraband—he is a mere probability. Multiple people 
were going in and out of the trailer and garage area, both of which were easily accessible 
and not locked. The people frequenting the area could very well have been the 
possessors of the drug and paraphernalia. Oftentimes, they were doing nothing. When 
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people have nothing to do, they frequently resort to drugs and alcohol to make the time 
go by faster. The State did nothing to bring in evidence that the others frequenting the 
workshop were not methamphetamine users. Excluding them as the possible sources for 
the methamphetamine would have been very simple and brief using histories. The State 
was required to do so under State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (Utah 1986). 
In State v. Salas, 820 P. 2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991), the court listed multiple 
factors that the State should have proved after evidence of multiple occupants to the 
buildings came in: "In order to find that the accused was in possession of drugs found in 
an automobile he was not the sole occupant of, and did not have sole access to, there 
must be other evidence to buttress such an inference. The law has recognized several 
particular evidentiary factors as linking or tending to link an accused with drugs. These 
include incriminating statements, suspicious or incriminating behavior, sale of drugs, use 
of drugs, proximity of defendant to location of drugs, drugs in plain view, and drugs on 
defendant's person." The State failed to bring in any evidence of incriminating 
statements or behavior, any sale or purchase of drugs, any use of drags by the Defendant, 
or that the drugs were on the Defendant's person. It also did not clearly establish that the 
drugs were in plain view. Under these circumstances, the Defendant's innocence was a 
very real likelihood. 
Importantly, the State also did not bring in any criminal histories of the named 
people, who were common visitors and who was the owner of the trailer at the time: 
Dwayne Solomon, Dustin Gledhill, Dillon Gledhill, or Trent Jensen. Each of these 
individuals could have been methamphetamine users who were responsible for the tossed 
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away paraphernalia. Others who had just been hanging out could have been the users, 
too. The evidence, therefore, failed to exclude the reasonable doubt that the drugs and 
paraphernalia were someone else's and the evidence of fingerprints showed clearly that 
they were, in fact, someone else's. There are at least four reasonable hypotheses: 
Dwayne did it, Dustin owned them, Dillon smoked it, and Trent left them. This set of 
facts and reasonable possibilities clearly fail to "preclude every reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence." State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986). 
n. 
T H E JURY MADE A CLEARLY ERRONEOUS FINDING OF GUILT BASED ON THE LACK O F 
SUFFICIENT DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PROVING BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT POSSESSED DRUG PARAPHERNALIA. 
A. The Defendant did not possess drug paraphernalia. 
As previously noted in Argument I, A, there was not sufficient direct or 
circumstantial evidence to prove that the Defendant "possessed" drug paraphernalia. In 
fact, the evidence shows it was possessed by someone else. The fingerprints show it and 
the lack of the Defendant's fingerprints on the evidence demonstrates it was not his. The 
location of the evidence also demonstrates it was discarded and perhaps even hidden 
among the mess. The Defendant never stated the evidence was his and he has no 
criminal history of using methamphetamine. There were multiple other potential sources 
for the evidence besides the Defendant. They could have included any number of the 
people who came to the garage and had free access to the office room to discard their 
used drugs. The State failed to exclude all of the named individuals as sources for the 
evidence by showing any lack of criminal history for methamphetamine. The State was 
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obligated in this case of proving guilt by circumstantial evidence to "preclude" (State v. 
Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986)) the reasonable inferences that the other sources 
could very well have been guilty, and not the Defendant. There was plenty of reasonable 
doubt that any reasonable jury would have had to entertain and wrongfully disregard in 
order to find the Defendant guilty. Under these circumstances, the jury made a clearly 
erroneous finding of guilt and their verdict should be overturned. 
III. 
THE JURY MADE A CLEARLY ERRONEOUS FINDING OF GUILT BASED ON THE LACK OF 
SUFFICIENT DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PROVING BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT POSSESSED DRUG PARAPHERNALIA WITH 
INTENT TO USE IT, AND TO USE IT FOR AT LEAST ONE OF TWENTY-TWO PURPOSES. 
A. The evidence did not prove the Defendant possessed drug paraphernalia to 
use it. 
"A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise 
to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 975 P. 
2d 501 (Utah App. 1999). Assuming the residue on the light bulbs was 
methamphetamine that had been smoked, assuming that the test of the residue was not 
contaminated, assuming that the residue and bulbs were of a recent nature, and assuming 
that the Defendant actually knew about their existence, the Defendant can only have been 
guilty of violating U.C.A. § 58-37A-5 if the State brought in enough evidence to 
eliminate all reasonable doubt as to whether the Defendant intended on using the drug 
paraphernalia. Remote or speculative possibilities are insufficient. Even assuming, but 
not conceding, the Defendant most certainly knew of the existence of the items and their 
potential for illegal use, "Knowledge and ability to possess do not eq[ual possession where 
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there is no evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge and ability." Spanish Fork 
City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 6l,1f 7, 975 P. 2d 501, 503; State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 
(Utah 1985). 
The statute states, "It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to 
use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, 
conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the 
human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty 
of a class B misdemeanor." U.C.A. § 58-37A-5. 
The State submitted no evidence that the light bulbs were the Defendant's that he 
used to inhale methamphetamine other than some proximity to them at the time the police 
entered the trailer. The fingerprints proved the bulbs were not his. The State failed to 
prove that he actually owned anything within the trailer portion where the bulbs were 
found. At most, the evidence showed that the workshop and office were areas where the 
Defendant usually worked, along with other people. The State never submitted any 
confession showing ownership or use of the bulbs, it never established that others did not 
own the bulbs, and there is room to doubt that the State even established by the evidence 
that the bulbs were in fact paraphernalia since the residue tested might have been 
contaminated by the paper used at the laboratory. What we are left with is the 
speculative possibility that someone—the Defendant—at the workshop may have been 
guilty. But "there is a difference between a reasonable inference and merely speculating 
about the possibilities." State v. Hester. 2000 Utah Ct. App 159, ^ 16, 3 P.3d 725. 
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Because the State failed to show the Defendant had even touched the bulbs, it also 
failed to show that the Defendant intended to use the bulbs for any purpose. Because the 
State failed to show that the Defendant had ever even touched methamphetamine, it also 
failed to show that the Defendant intended to use the bulbs for any purpose, including the 
inhalation of methamphetamine. His intent in this regard is mere speculation. 
In addition, the law requires the State to have shown that the Defendant had an 
intent to exercise dominion or control over the paraphernalia, however, if it was 
paraphernalia, then it appeared to be discarded by where it was located and by the burnt 
residue on it. Discarding the contraband shows no intent to exercise any control or 
dominion over the items discarded, rejected, or abandoned. Thus, the State clearly failed 
to meet its burden that the Defendant had amy intent to do anything with the bulbs, and, 
therefore failed to meet an element of U.C.A. § 58-37A-5 for which he was wrongfully 
convicted. At most, there are inferences giving rise to speculations of guilt based on the 
inadequate circumstantial evidence and the sloppy investigation in this case. 
IV. 
T H E TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE U T A H 
STATUTE § 5 8 - 3 7 A - 5 WHEN IT ALLOWED T H E J U R Y ' S FINDING T O REMAIN AS 
SUFFICIENT WHEN THE J U R Y ' S FINDING ENTIRELY FAILED T O MENTION W H E T H E R THE 
DEFENDANT HAD ANY INTENT T O USE T H E PARTICULAR DRUG PARAPHERNALIA. 
A. The Defendant is not guilty because the jury did not find an element of the 
crime. 
A defendant must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all the elements 
of a crime. Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61,1f 5, 975 P. 2d 501, 502; State 
v. Piep. 2004 UT 850, \ 11, 84 P.3d 853; State v. Larsen. 2000 UT App 106,1f 10, 999 
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P.2d 1252. This is "to ensure that our review of the evidence does not encourage the 
indulging of inference upon inference, or, worse, the indulging of inference upon 
assumption." State v. Layman, 953 P. 2d 782, 791 (Utah App. 1998). 
It is even a state constitutional requirement implicit in "constitutions...[which] 
recognize the fundamental principles that are deemed essential for the protection of life 
and liberty." Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488, 16 S.Ct 353, 40 L.Ed. 499 
(1895). (1895). The Utah Constitution requires such. Utah Const., Art. I, § 7 ("No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.55). 
Emphasis added. 
In the current matter, on count two, possession of paraphernalia, the jury only 
found the Defendant guilty of "possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class B 
misdemeanor,55 (Transcript, p.338) not possession "with intent to use[] drug 
paraphernalia55 for any of the twenty-two specified "purpose[s].55 U.C.A. § 58-37A-5. 
The jury failed to find the Defendant guilty of one of the elements of the crime. The trial 
court even approved of the legally deficient finding when it said, "It appears to the Court 
that the verdict is appropriate.55 Transcript, p. 340. Because an essential element had not 
been found, the Defendant is not guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia with the 
intent to use it. Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS THE CHARGE OF POSSESSION BASED ON A BROKEN CHAIN OF EVIDENCE 
WHEN THE COURT ITSELF STATED THAT "WE MAY NOT HAVE EXACTLY A PERFECT 
CHAIN OF EVIDENCE OR CHAIN OF CUSTODY." 
A. The broken chain of custody led to the wrongful admission of evidence. 
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According to the Utah Supreme Court, there is "no error where chain of custody 
was established by having all persons who handled evidence testify." State v. Madsen, 
498 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1972). 
Here, there was a broken chain of evidence because no one testified about how the 
baggie with the residue came from the laboratory to the evidence locker and how the 
evidence came from the evidence locker to the trial court. The trial court itself stated that 
"we may not have exactly a perfect chain of evidence or chain of custody." Transcript, 
p. 241. The Defendant motioned to dismiss the trial based on the error of the broken 
chain of custody. The trial court denied it, but under State v. Madsen there was error and 
the Defendant's verdict should be reversed on these grounds. 
VI. 
THE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PLAIN ERROR OR 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE OF THE SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE WHEN THE STATE 
FAILED TO BRING FORTH A URINE SAMPLE IT INITIALLY SAID WAS LOST, BUT THEN 
REPRESENTED IT WAS STILL IN EXISTENCE. 
A. The trial court erred in not dismissing the case due to the State destroying 
potentially exculpatory evidence. 
Plain error occurs when a trial court does not dismiss a case because there was (1) 
error (2) that is plain (3) that affected substantial rights of the Defendant and (4) which 
error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings. 
As previously discussed in Argument I, A with the law cited (including California 
v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), the 
Defendant was taken to the county jail and he gave a urine sample to law^  enforcement. 
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Transcript, pp. 151, 178. According to the case agent, the urine sample had been 
"transferred to Fillmore, but it is in the freezer, it is frozen, it is in Fillmore." Transcript, 
p. 152. 
The urine sample was either exculpatory evidence that was withheld, inculpatory 
evidence that was not important enough to be a part of the State's case, or it was lost 
through careless safekeeping of the evidence. It was never produced, even after multiple 
requests by Defendant, over a six month period. Ultimately, the trial court told the jury it 
was lost and never sent to the crime lab. Transcript, pp. 151-152, 164, 241-243, 246-253, 
302. This was plain error or an abuse of discretion after the testimony that the urine 
sample had been sent to Fillmore. 
Here, the urine sample testing dirty would have been highly relevant to help show 
the Defendant's guilt and it testing clean would have been highly relevant to help show 
he was not guilty. Transcript, p. 243. The State's failure to produce it at trial was a 
spoliation of evidence. In essence, the State's actions toward it were tantamount to the 
destruction of evidence in violation of the Defendant's Due Process rights. California v. 
Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). The case 
must be overturned and the jury verdict reversed because this was clearly error, it was 
plain, it affected the Defendant's substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness of 
the proceedings against the Defendant. 
VII. 
THE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PLAIN ERROR 
BECAUSE OF THE STATE WITHHOLDING POTENTIALLY EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN 
THE FORM OF A NON-PRODUCED URINE SAMPLE THAT HAD BEEN REQUESTED TWICE 
BY MOTIONS AND WHICH THE STATE CONTINUED TO ASSERT WAS NOT LOST AT TRIAL. 
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Based on the law stated above (including, but not limited to California v. 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984) and the 
reasons stated in Argument I, A and VI, the State's withholding of evidence violated the 
Defendant's rights and under the doctrine of plain error—the trial court clearly erred in 
not dismissing the case after the evidence showed that the State in fact had the highly 
relevant and potentially exculpatory evidence, but were simply refusing to produce it. 
VIII. 
T H E TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY 
INSTRUCTION THAT IS CONSISTENT W I T H CASE LAW REGARDING THE S T A T E ' S NEED 
T O PRECLUDE ALL REASONABLE POSSIBILITIES O R ALTERNATE HYPOTHESES OF 
INNOCENCE IN CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CASES IN ORDER FOR A DEFENDANT TO BE 
FOUND GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
A. The Defendant's jury instruction should have been used. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[w]here the only evidence presented 
against the defendant is circumstantial, the evidence supporting a conviction must 
preclude every reasonable hypothesis of irmocence. This is because the existence of a 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt." State v. Hilj 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion) 
(citing State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). 
The State read to the jury an instruction, saying, "I want you to focus your 
attention towards the bottom of that paragraph." Transcript, 317. The State went on to 
explain that "possession" element is sufficiently met if the controlled substance is found 
"quote, under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over it." Transcript, 317. This focus is clearly 
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. . : ; ; . • : • - . : . to "focus" on the language o! tlu- instruction 
referring to "circumstances Mu M;iti made it abundantly clear thai a was .dying on 
circumstantial e\ idence to coi meet tl: te Defei ida i it to tl ic z\ lai ged ci ii nes 
In response, the Defendant offei ed a jury instruction It read: "You at e not 
permitted to find., the defendant guilt} of the • charges agaii i.st 1 iii t i based t : talh - 311 
cm iimsliintml r* hlrnre unless lite pioved circumstances are not only consistent with the 
theory the defendant is guilty of the crime, 1 ;• ^ * he recou i-u" ^ ^ , .n\ her 
rat ional conclusion •,
 ( i .«n<_'u<ii\ ueic, 11 i^ 
consistent with State v. Hill * hr tnai i-nn howevei . rejected 'l^ I )efendant 's proposed 
j u r y instructioi 1 that would explain thai (lie Stale has tlie buulen 111 i/mjuni'ilnnlial 
( , , L t, .,%1) , ^ ionable inferences that point to innocence. This was 
ermi and not u^UKlim* n \\<r* prejudicial to the Defendant because , lacking it. the jury 
found h i m guilty 3 v ei 11. tl 101 1 gh tl; i..ei e \ \i ei e :leai i> altei nate. at id t easoiiable inferences of 
innocence. In othei words, '"the jury would likely have found him not guilt} v\ ith the 
instruction. 
Conclusion 
Reversal is appropriate "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconiliKiu' * iiihcn'ntlv nnpinhalili' 1 Ii*• 1 ira^nimhli nnnil1, must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that itu defendant committed the eniue o! which he s\a> •- on\ irt:d " 
State v. Salas. 820 P „u i »- \n. \ H ^late v .miniMm 
I I r";" <' " ^ I*>«*>>, accoul Siau. >. . i-na^ ^AJ P.id V02, 905 (Liah App. 1990); State v. 
Jamison, 767 P 2d 134, 117 ft Hah App 1089) 
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In this case at trial, because of the following reasons, reversal is appropriate. The 
jury must have entertained reasonable doubt as to the Defendant's guilt—(1) the 
Defendant was never seen touching the evidence, having the evidence on his person, or 
doing any other kind of incriminating behavior, (2) he never tested positive for 
methamphetamine—ever, (3) he never had any criminal history of using 
methamphetamine, (4) he never confessed to even knowing of the light bulbs in all of the 
mess of the office, which bulbs were not necessarily even in plain view, (5) someone 
else's fingerprints were on the tested light bulb, (6) the Defendant was not the sole 
occupant of the workshop that many others worked in, hung out in, and did nothing in, 
(7) the State failed to show the other occupants, who had free access to the constantly 
open office, were not users of methamphetamine that had used the light bulbs by at least 
producing their criminal histories, (8) the age of the methamphetamine was never 
established and could have been as old as twenty years and coming from the original 
owner of the trailer and not the Defendant, (9) and the very existence of the 
methamphetamine was in reasonable doubt due to an admittedly real contamination 
potential at the laboratory. 
Based on the numerous examples of reasonable doubt, no reasonable jury could 
have found the Defendant guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted. As such, this 
Court should reverse the verdict and acquit the Defendant. 
Further, "the erroneous admission of evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to set 
aside a verdict unless it had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict." 
Bambrough v. Bethers. 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976); State v. Echevarrieta, 621 P.2d 709 
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(Utah 1980). The admission of evidence in this case was erroneous, due to the real 
contamination problems and broken chain of evidence Without the erroneously admitted 
would clearly have resulted in a different verdict (or outcome). 
I lie rejection of the Defendant' s jiu j T ii isti tic: tion caused the sari le pi ejudice and a 
guilty verdict. The plain error in not dismissing the case for spoliation of evidence or for 
the wi thholding of exculpatory7 evidence in the urine sample after the case agent testified 
vhei e it acti ialb * as ei i 01 and cai rsed a gi lilty v ei cii, ::1, ' 1 1 le p u > fa t : find at i 
essential e lement of possess ion; therefore, the possession charge(s) should hav e beei 1 
dismissed. 
For all these reasons, the verdict must be reversed and the Defendant treated as 
innocent. 
DAli-i ^ day oi ueeemhM .<•" ). 
Attorney for Appellant ~\^J 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Docketing Statement was mailed by 
first class mail or otherwise delivered this 16th day of December 2010 to the following: 
Criminal Appeals Division 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Dated tins \^ day of December 2010. 
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Kc JuincsCiabb, <1ase ><20(Wld4f. 
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Tlv adcienciurn In Mr Ctabb's jppellate brief is not necessary. 
Sincerely, ^fxf 
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